

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INR-10

NSAE-00 RSC-01 PM-03 DODE-00 ACDA-10 MBFR-02 SAJ-01

PRS-01 EB-03 L-02 NEA-06 RSR-01 /075 W

----- 001811

P R 221908 Z MAY 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5238

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION BERLIN

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

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TAGS: PFOR, GW, UR
SUBJECT: BREZHNEV VISIT TO FRG

SUMMARY: THE CHANCELLOR ASKED ME TO COME TO THE PALAIS SCHAUMBURG MAY 22, IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS RETURN FROM DEPARTURE CEREMONIES AT THE AIRPORT, FOR A BRIEFING ON THE BREZHNEV VISIT. HE COVERED PRINCIPALLY CSCE AND MBFR, THE BERLIN QUESTION, AND FRG- USSR ECONOMIC COOPERATION, BUT ALSO PROVIDED SOME INTERESTING INSIGHTS INTO BREZHNEV'S STYLE AND PERSONALITY AS THEY WERE REVEALED TO THE GERMANS DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS. BRANDT APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD FORM DESPITE THE RIGORS OF THE VISIT AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME RATHER HARD AND UNPLEASANT BARGAINING, PARTICULARLY ON THE BERLIN PORTION OF THE JOINT DECLARATION. END SUMMARY.

1. BRANDT OPENED BY SAYING THAT HE WANTED TO GIVE ME AN INITIAL BRIEFING EVEN THOUGH HE AND HIS ASSOCIATES HAD NOT YET HAD TIME TO RECORD ALL OF THE RESULTS OF THE VISIT AND SUBJECT THEM TO A CAREFUL EVALUATION.

2. CSCE. BREZHNEV PRESSED FOR RAPID MOVEMENT ON THE SECURITY CONFERENCE, ASKING WHY IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE, AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF PHASE I, FOR THE EXPERTS SIMPLY TO STAY ON AND BEGIN THEIR WORK RIGHT AWAY. THIS WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO HOLD THE FINAL SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE (WHICH BREZHNEV WANTED HELD AT THE LEVEL OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT) BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. BREZHNEV DID NOT INSIST THAT THE FIRST PHASE BEGIN BEFORE THE END OF JUNE; ON THE CONTRARY, HE INDICATED THAT A SLIGHT DELAY MIGHT BE DESIRABLE FROM THE SOVIET STANDPOINT SINCE GROMYKO WOULD JUST HAVE RETURNED FROM THE VISIT TO THE U. S. AND WOULD NEED A LITTLE TIME TO ORGANIZE HIMSELF. IN VIEW OF THIS, HE SUGGESTED THAT THE 3 RD OF JULY MIGHT BE A REASONABLE OPENING DATE.

3. BRANDT SAID HE TRIED TO CALM BREZHNEV'S EAGERNESS FOR RAPID MOVEMENT BY POINTING OUT THAT IT WOULD MAKE SENSE TO BEGIN THE COMMITTEE PHASE ONLY AFTER SUMMER VACATION, SAY, IN SEPTEMBER. BREZHNEV SHOWED NO UNDER-
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STANDING FOR THIS, ARGUING THAT SUMMER VACATIONS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO INTERFERE WHEN TRULY GREAT THINGS ARE AFOOT. BRANDT ALSO MADE CLEAR TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY THAT THE FRG PREFERRED TO REMAIN FLEXIBLE AS TO THE LEVEL AT WHICH THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE SHOULD TAKE PLACE. ASCRIBING THESE VIEWS TO FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL, BRANDT TOLD BREZHNEV THAT THE LEVEL SHOULD

PERHAPS DEPEND ON THE SUCCESS OF THE FIRST TWO PHASES:
IF THE RESULTS WERE EXCELLENT, THEY SHOULD PERHAPS INDEED
RECEIVE THE IMPRIMATUR OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT; BUT IF
THEY WERE ONLY MEDIOCRE, ATTENDANCE OF THE FOREIGN
MINISTERS AT THE FINAL SESSION MIGHT HAVE TO DO.

4. AS FOR THE SITE OF THE FINAL CONFERENCE, BREZHNEV
APPEARED TO HAVE NO STRONG PREFERENCES. HE MENTIONED
PARIS BUT SAID HE WAS OPEN TO MANY ALTERNATIVES INCLUD-
ING EVEN BONN OR MOSCOW. HOWEVER, HE WAS OPPOSED TO
HELSINKI. BRANDT SAID THE FRG HAD A CERTAIN PREFERENCE
FOR VIENNA FOR THE FINAL STAGE AND THOUGHT THAT
GENEVA WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR THE COMMITTEE PHASE. HOW-
EVER, THESE WERE NOT STRONG PREFERENCES.

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PRS-01 EB-03 L-02 NEA-06 RSR-01 /075 W
----- 001892

P R 221908 Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5239
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
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5. IN PRESSING FOR GREATER URGENCY ON CSCE, BREZHNEV TOLD BRANDT THAT THE U. S. HAD AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET THIS CONFERENCE BEHIND US. BRANDT SAID HIS REPLY TO THIS WAS THAT THE FRG WOULD NOT PUT ITSELF IN THE POSITION OF BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR A FAILURE TO COMPLETE THE CSCE PROCESS THIS YEAR.

6. MBFR. BRANDT SAID BREZHNEV HAD MADE CLEAR THAT, ALTHOUGH PREPARATIONS IN VIENNA COULD CONTINUE, GENUINE NEGOTIATIONS ON MBFR COULD ONLY BEGIN AFTER ALL PHASES OF CSCE HAD BEEN CONCLUDED. IN DISCUSSING THE SUBSTANCE OF MBFR, BRANDT SAID, BREZHNEV WAS EXTREMELY SPECIFIC ABOUT CONFIDENCE- BUILDING MEASURES AND RATHER VAGUE ABOUT REDUCTIONS AS SUCH. HE OBVIOUSLY ATTRIBUTED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE FORMER AND WENT INTO CONSIDERABLE DETAIL IN TALKING ABOUT THE VALUE OF HAVING OBSERVERS AT MANEUVERS AND EXCHANGING INFORMATION ON TROOP MOVEMENTS OF ANY SIGNIFICANT SIZE. (IN THIS CONNECTION, BRANDT MENTIONED THAT DEFENSE MINISTER LEBER HAD BEEN POINTED OUT TO BREZHNEV ON THE FIRST EVENING OF THE VISIT AS THE MAN WHO HAD CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS INTRODUCING LARGE NUMBERS OF NEW MILITARY UNITS INTO THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN AREA. BREZHNEV SAID THAT THIS ILLUSTRATED WHY IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE TWO SIDES TO KEEP EACH OTHER MUTUALLY INFORMED.)

7. AS FOR REDUCTIONS PROPER, BRANDT SAID THAT BREZHNEV HAD TAKEN A VERY CAUTIOUS APPROACH -- EVEN MORE CAUTIOUS THAN THE ONE THE GERMANS UNDERSTOOD HE HAD TAKEN IN HIS RECENT TALKS WITH MR. KISSINGER, AS REPORTED TO ALLIES BY USDEL NATO. HE SAID THAT INITIAL REDUCTIONS HAD TO BE REGARDED AS SYMBOLIC IN CHARACTER, AND THAT FURTHER REDUCTIONS COULD ONLY BE MADE IN STAGES OVER A LONG PERIOD. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PRESERVE THE EXISTING BALANCE BETWEEN STATIONED TROOPS AND INDIGENOUS TROOPS. BREZHNEV POINTED OUT THAT ONE AREA, THAT OF STRATEGIC

WEAPONS, HAD TO BE DISCUSSED BILATERALLY BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U. S.; HE ALSO MADE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT HE DID NOT MEAN TO INCLUDE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THIS HEADING. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTIONS FROM ME, BRANDT SAID THAT BREZHNEV HAD NOT TOUCHED AT ALL ON THE

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SUBJECT OF FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS (FBS).

8. BERLIN. BRANDT SAID THE EFFORTS OF THE FRG SIDE TO OBTAIN SOME SATISFACTION WITH REGARD TO THEIR CONCERNS OVER BERLIN HAD CAUSED MORE DIFFICULTY THAN ANY OTHER SUBJECT DURING THE VISIT. THE SOVIETS HAD NOT RESPONDED WILLINGLY AND ON OCCASION HAD REBUFFED EFFORTS BY BAHR AND SCHEEL TO RAISE BERLIN WITH THEM. THE SOVIETS PROPOSED THAT THEY SIMPLY ADOPT FOR THE JOINT DECLARATION THE SAME LANGUAGE USED IN THE SOVIET- GDR COMMUNIQUE OF MAY 13. 1973. THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE FRG WHICH, FOR ITS PART, WANTED TO INCLUDE LANGUAGE CONCERNING THE " TIES" BETWEEN THE FRG AND BERLIN. THEIR COMPROMISE WAS TO DO NEITHER BUT TO EXPRESS THEIR AGREEMENT THAT " STRICT ADHERENCE TO AND IMPLEMENTATION OF" THE BERLIN AGREEMENT WAS A " SIGNIFICANT CONDITION" FOR EUROPEAN DETENTE. (SEE PARAGRAPH 17 OF BONN 7321 FOR FULL TEXT OF JOINT DECLARATION LANGUAGE ON BERLIN.) BRANDT, OBVIOUSLY BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY ABOUT HOW THE SOVIETS ARE GOING TO BEHAVE IN BERLIN, SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT RELUCTANT TO USE THE WORD " CONDITION" (VORAUSSETZUNG).

9. I ASKED BRANDT WHETHER BREZHNEV HAD GIVEN HIM ANY ASSURANCES AT ALL ABOUT THE FUTURE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS BERLIN. BRANDT SAID HE HAD NOT AND THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO WAIT AND SEE WHAT EFFECT IF ANY WOULD BE PRODUCED ON THE SOVIETS BY THE EMPHASIS GIVEN TO BERLIN MATTERS BY THE GERMAN SIDE. BRANDT SAID HE TOLD BREZHNEV, IN GROMYKO' S PRESENCE, THAT FRG- USSR RELATIONS WOULD BE " POISONED" IF THINGS WENT " DIFFERENTLY THAN AS DISCUSSED" DURING THE BREZHNEV VISIT (I. E. IF THE USSR CONTINUED TO INTERFERE IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY WITH THE EFFORTS OF THE FRG TO EXPAND ITS TIES AND TO REPRESENT BERLIN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT). THE CHANCELLOR SAID THE FACT THAT THREE AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN CONCLUDED BECAUSE THEY HAD SATISFACTORY BERLIN CLAUSES BUT THAT THE COMPLETION OF TWO OTHERS HAD BEEN FORESTALLED BY FAILURE TO AGREE ON THE INCLUSION OF BERLIN PROVIDED CON-

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TINUING EVIDENCE TO THE SOVIETS OF THE IMPORTANCE THE

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PRS-01 EB-03 L-02 NEA-06 RSR-01 /075 W
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P R 221908 Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5240
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
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FRG ATTACHES TO THIS MATTER.

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10. ECONOMIC COOPERATION. BRANDT SAID THAT BREZHNEV HAD BEEN EXPANSIVE IN HIS DISCUSSION OF THIS FIELD AND THAT IN THE PROCESS HE HAD BUILT WHAT BRANDT DESCRIBED AS " A LOT OF CASTLES IN THE AIR". HE HAD OBVIOUSLY TRIED TO PLAY THE FRG OFF AGAINST THE U. S. BY POINTING TO THE MANY DEALS THAT HAD BEEN CONCLUDED WITH U. S. FIRMS AND TO THE FACT THAT U. S. INTEREST RATES ARE LOWER. HE ALSO REFERRED TO PLANS FOR COOPERATION WITH JAPAN ON SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, IMPLYING THAT THE JAPANESE WERE BEING MORE COOPERATIVE AND VENTURE-SOME THAT THE FRG SEEMED INCLINED TO BE. WHEN IT WAS POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT SOME OF THE VAST SCHEMES HE HAD IN MIND MIGHT EXCEED THE CAPACITY OF GERMAN FIRMS, HE RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINT GERMAN- AMERICAN- SOVIET TRIANGULAR PROJECTS. HE ALSO AT ONE POINT REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF TRIANGULAR JAPANESE- AMERICAN- SOVIET PROJECTS.

11. BRANDT FOUND IT INTERESTING THAT BREZHNEV HAD STRESSED TWICE TO HIM THAT HE " RECOGNIZED" THE EEC. BRANDT THOUGHT THERE WAS SOME SIGNIFICANCE IN THE FACT THAT EARLIER SOVIET STATEMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT HAD REFERRED TO THE " COMMON MARKET". (THE CHANCELLOR SEEMS TO THINK THAT THIS SHIFT OF USAGE INDICATED A NEW RUSSIAN WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AS MORE THAN AN ECONOMIC UNION, BUT FROM THE WAY HE DESCRIBED IT TO ME IT DOES NOT SEEM TO BE PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT.)

12. BRANDT NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT PRESSED FOR A FORMAL AGREEMENT ON CONSULTATIONS, LIKE THE ONES CONCLUDED WITH FRANCE AND THE U. S., BUT HAD BEEN SATISFIED TO PUT LANGUAGE ON CONSULTATIONS INTO THE JOINT DECLARATION (SEE PARAGRAPH 4 OF BONN 7321). IN THIS CONNECTION, I ASKED BRANDT ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMISSION. HE NOTED THAT THIS WAS REGULARLY SCHEDULED TO MEET AGAIN IN NOVEMBER BUT THAT, OWING TO THE STATED DESIRE TO INTENSIFY ECONOMIC RELATIONS, THIS DATE MIGHT BE ADVANCED SOMEWHAT.

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13. BRANDT HAD SEVERAL INTERESTING THINGS TO SAY ABOUT

BREZHNEV'S PERSONALITY AND STYLE. FOR ONE THING, HE SAID THE GENERAL SECRETARY IS DEVELOPING AN INCREASINGLY STRONG TENDENCY TO TURN DIALOGUES INTO MONOLOGUES, HARDLY PERMITTING HIS INTERLOCUTORS TO GET A WORD IN EDGEWISE. (BRANDT NOTED THAT HENRY KISSINGER MUST HAVE HAD SOME EXPERIENCE WITH THIS PROBLEM DURING RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW.) IT WAS NECESSARY TO BE PATIENT, TO KEEP POINTING OUT THAT YOU HAD THINGS TO SAY, AND EVENTUALLY TO PRESENT THEM AS BEST YOU COULD. A FURTHER COMPLICATING FACTOR WAS THAT BREZHNEV REFUSED TO DISCUSS BUSINESS AT TABLE, INSISTING ON USING THIS TIME FOR JOKES, STORYTELLING, ETC.

14. BREZHNEV ASKED THE CHANCELLOR A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP TO WASHINGTON: WHETHER IT WAS INDEED NECESSARY TO SPEND A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TIME SLEEPING OFF THE EFFECTS OF THE FLIGHT (BRANDT CONFIRMED THAT FOR HIM IT WAS); AND WHETHER COWBOY FILMS WERE SHOWN AT CAMP DAVID (BRANDT SAID HE

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PRS-01 EB-03 L-02 NEA-06 RSR-01 /075 W
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P R 221908 Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5241
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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HAD RECENTLY SEEN SOME GOOD ONES THERE).

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15. SOME MARGINAL COMMENTS ON THE VISIT FROM BRANDT' S
ASSISTANTS, SCHILLING AND SANNE MAY BE OF INTEREST:

(A) THE GREAT ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFICULTY OF THE
VISIT AROSE BECAUSE THE SOVIET SIDE, FOR SECURITY' S
SAKE, INSISTED ON COMPLETE FLEXIBILITY. NO FIRM
SCHEDULE COULD EVEN BE ESTABLISHED AMONG PLANNERS, LET
ALONE MADE PUBLIC. AT THE SAME TIME, THE GENERAL
SECRETARY EXPECTED EVERYTHING TO WORK.

(B) VERY FEW ON THE SOVIET SIDE ARE BOLD ENOUGH
TO APPROACH BREZHNEV TO TELL HIM ANYTHING THAT HE MIGHT
POSSIBLY FIND UNPLEASANT. THE ONLY ONES WHO WERE WILL-
ING TO DO THIS, SO FAR AS THE GERMANS COULD DISCERN,
WERE BREZHNEV' S PERSONAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS,
ALEXANDROV AND BLATOV, AND THE SECURITY CHIEF, ANTONOV.

(C) THE DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN
ALEXANDROV AND BLATOV WAS NOT FULLY CLEAR TO THE
GERMANS, BUT IT APPEARED TO THEM THAT THE FORMER HAD A
MORE DIRECT CONCERN WITH POLICY TOWARD THE U. S. WHEREAS
BLATOV' S AREA OF CONCENTRATION WAS EUROPE.
HILLENBRAND

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** LIMDIS

*** Current Classification *** SECRET

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts:
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 22 MAY 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973BONN07381
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: RR
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730550/aaaajnge.tel
Line Count: 488
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <09-Aug-2001 by shawdg>; APPROVED <12-Sep-2001 by boyleja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> gwr 980225
Subject: BREZHNEV VISIT TO FRG
TAGS: PFOR, GW, UR
To: ANKARA
ATHENS
BRUSSELS
COPENHAGEN
EUR
LISBON
ROME

SECSTATE WASHDC
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Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005